The article analyzes Bruce Ackerman’s lecture at the UNAM Law Faculty on rebuilding American democracy after Trump. It argues that Donald Trump’s presidency illustrates several dangers Ackerman identified in The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, including the growing concentration of presidential power, plebiscitary leadership, politics driven by emotional appeals, and the expansive use of emergency powers. To address these risks, Ackerman proposes reforms aimed at restoring checks and balances, including the creation of a Supreme Executive Tribunal and stronger Senate oversight of the White House. The article, however, argues that these reforms may be insufficient in a context of deep political polarization and democratic erosion. It suggests that institutional engineering alone cannot protect democracy. The defense of constitutional government also requires political pluralism, organized opposition, and a robust public sphere capable of limiting executive power.
The article analyzes Bruce Ackerman’s lecture at the UNAM Law Faculty on rebuilding American democracy after Trump. It argues that Donald Trump’s presidency illustrates several dangers Ackerman identified in The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, including the growing concentration of presidential power, plebiscitary leadership, politics driven by emotional appeals, and the expansive use of emergency powers. To address these risks, Ackerman proposes reforms aimed at restoring checks and balances, including the creation of a Supreme Executive Tribunal and stronger Senate oversight of the White House. The article, however, argues that these reforms may be insufficient in a context of deep political polarization and democratic erosion. It suggests that institutional engineering alone cannot protect democracy. The defense of constitutional government also requires political pluralism, organized opposition, and a robust public sphere capable of limiting executive power. Read More